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1 Introduction
Most macroeconomic and policy commentaries between 2007 and 2010 have been dominated by one
obsessively worrisome news item: the U.S. real estate sector was in the middle of a convulsive bust
characterized by downward spiraling prices and transaction volumes. As Glaeser (2013) recently
emphasized, such a bust was not the first and possibly not even the largest among those recorded in
the history of the United States, but what he calls the “Great Convulsion” was sufficiently strong to
produce one of the deepest recessions of the last two centuries and a full-blown financial crisis.
In this paper, we investigate whether the dominant view of the 2007-2010 real estate bust as pre-
dominantly consisting of a house price deflation phenomenon has any foundations from a rational asset
pricing perspective.1 Equivalently, we ask whether asset market transaction data are compatible with
the hypothesis of any abnormal or exceptional dynamics having affected either the housing/residential
or the mortgage financing sectors, differentially from other, non-residential business-related segments
of the U.S. real estate market.2
We answer this question through the lens of a well established Merton (1973)-style Intertemporal
CAPM (I-CAPM) setting and use advanced time series methods to understand whether the tumble
in real estate prices derived from either a correction of a previous large mispricing of real estate (or
parts of it), as proxied by Jensen’s alphas, or whether it was an irrationally precipitated event that is
difficult to rationalize within a simple asset pricing framework. Figure 1 supports our development of
formal tests of this hypothesis: the valuations of residential and mortgage real estate led other sectors
between early 2007 and Summer 2008; yet, the bottom panel highlights that they also recovered before
most other sectors after 2009 and appear to display dynamics that is different from business-related
real estate indexes.
In methodological terms, we make two key choices; first, supported by a recent real estate finance
literature (see, e.g., Cotter and Roll 2011 and Gyourko 2009) that establishes robust links between
publicly traded securities and underlying real assets, we use closing market price data at monthly
frequency of real estate investment trusts (REITs) to measure real estate valuations. In this respect,
the use of REITs instead of property valuations is key for our purposes as our asset pricing framework
requires data on liquid assets traded in a possibly frictionless market. Because REITs offer abundant,
high-quality data for a variety of sectors, they give us the chance to perform tests that distinguish
2
among portfolios of housing-related, of mortgage, and of non-residential real estate investments. Such
tests would be impossible should one use appraisal-based or repeat-sale data that are subject to
upward biases and quality homogeneity issues, and generally available for houses only.
Second, we analyze the pricing of U.S. real estate assets in an encompassing no-arbitrage dynamic
multi-factor framework by training a model to jointly price stocks, government bonds, corporate
bonds, as well as REITs, using a set of macro-financial risk factors that are capable of pricing the
cross-section of U.S. securities (see Del Negro and Otrok 2007 for a related example). As discussed
by Smith and Smith (2006), to gauge the existence of mis-pricings in the real estate sector, it is
fundamental to incorporate also cross-sectional data on other assets. The model emphasizes the
existence of no-arbitrage conditions between real estate and other financial assets, in the tradition of
Case and Shiller (1989).
Our estimation approach based on Bayesian model averaging techniques allows us to incorporate
uncertainty about which combination of macroeconomic variables most effectively summarizes the
properties of the pricing dynamics. Indeed, existing asset pricing theories are not explicit about
which risk factors should enter as explanatory variables, and the multiplicity of potential macro-
financial risk factors makes the empirical evidence difficult to interpret. Therefore, we build from
existing literature and implement a Bayesian model-averaging approach in which uncertainty on the
“correct” set of macro-financial risk variables can be accommodated. We assume that both the level
of risk exposures and (the log of) the residual variance are time-varying and subject to stochastic
discrete breaks. Finally, we relax the assumption often taken in existing empirical studies that posits
that the covariance matrix of the residuals is diagonal, such that the presence of a factor structure in
the residuals is not ruled out a priori.
We report a few novel findings. First, an analysis of cross-sectional mis-pricing reveals no evidence
of a pure housing/residential real estate abnormal valuations inflating between 1999 and 2007, to
subsequently burst. In fact, we obtain ex-post evidence that the entire real estate sector shows
realized excess returns that have been higher than what would have been justified by the exposures to
systematic risk factors. Additionally, and with the partial exception of lodging/resort and mortgage
investments, all sector REITs describe a homogeneous dynamics over time. Between 1999 and 2007,
all alphas climb up, in some cases going from a few basis point per month to as high as 1.5 percent.
This was the great U.S. real estate bubble, with trading volumes, borrowing, and prices all exploding
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at the same time and contradicting the occasionally reported conclusions that financial models would
be able to justify the real estate valuations that were witnessed between 2004 and 2007 (see e.g.,
Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko 2013, Smith and Smith 2006). In this sense, the real estate fad has
been pervasive. Also the claim that over-valuations in real estate would have been a debt/mortgage-
fueled one is consistent with the fact that the posterior median intercept of Mortgage REITs, which
was the highest in the early 2000s, sensibly dropped in 2005 anticipating an extensive correction in
the pricing mechanism of real estate investments as a whole.
Second, we show that few factors carry most of the explanatory power among a large set of macro-
financial variables. While market risk shows the greatest significance in explaining excess returns for
equity REITs portfolios, unexpected inflation immediately ranks second to approximate the dynamic
properties of the pricing kernel. Also, interest rates risk and money growth substantially affect the
dynamics of excess returns on real estate investments. Except for occasional nuances, widely used
macroeconomic risk factors such as aggregate credit and default spreads, liquidity, human capital,
industrial production and consumption growth, do not sensibly contribute to the pricing of real
estate assets.
Third, we find differences in the structure as well the dynamics of risk factor exposures across
residential vs. industrial, office, and retail REITs. This means that, indeed, residential REITs, most
related to housing, were “special” during our sample, and in particular during the years in which the
alleged housing bubble in early 2000s built up. For instance, residential REITs are characterized by
a predominantly negative exposure to the slope of the yield curve. Instead, REITs that specialize in
industrial and office investments carry a neutral exposure to interest rate risk until the last part of
the sample.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the research design and methodology.
Section 3 represents the heart of the paper and contains our main empirical findings, with special
emphasis on the dichotomy residential vs. business REITs. Section 4 presents a battery of economic
tests used to justify the use of the proposed model as a benchmark against alternative specifications.
Section 5 concludes. We leave to the appendix further details of the estimation procedure.
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2 Research Design and Methodology
One crucial assumption that lies in the back of our research is that REITs may be used to proxy
the valuations in the U.S. real estate market. Even though testing this connection is beyond the
scope of our paper, luckily there is a well developed real estate finance literature that has examined
exactly this link. While the early literature had reported mixed findings about the suitability to use
REIT as a proxy for property values (see e.g., Ling and Naranjo 2003; Jirasakuldech, Campbell, and
Knight 2006), most recent results are largely consistent with the claim that REITs are informative
of the state of the real estate market in its various components and disaggregation (see, e.g. Clayton
and MacKinnon 2003; Ghysels, Plazzi, Torous, and Valkanov 2012 and the references therein). For
instance, Chiang (2009) shows that past returns on public markets can forecast returns in real, physical
markets. This result is coherent with the notion that public markets are more efficient in processing
information than private markets.
Finally, there is a general widespread concern that the REIT industry may be susceptible to specu-
lative bubbles because the underlying, primitive real estate market itself is vulnerable to speculations,
(see, e.g., Mikhed and Zemcˇ´ık 2009, Lai and Van Order 2010, and Nneji, Brooks, and Ward 2013).
Such a conjecture has been formally tested in a number of papers. Among them, Jirasakuldech et al.
(2006) reject the hypothesis of rational speculative bubbles in equity REITs using a vector of macroe-
conomic fundamentals and a range of econometric methods, including co-integration tests. However,
their data fail to include the financial crisis period and their methods fail to include ICAPM-style
factor regressions, differently from our paper.
Payne and Waters (2007) use a momentum threshold auto-regressive (MTAR) model and the
residuals-augmented Dickey-Fuller test to examine the possibility of periodically collapsing bubbles
in the equity REIT market. They report mixed results that turn out to depend on the methods
employed and on the specific equity REIT sub-sectors analyzed. On the opposite, Anderson, Brooks,
and Tsolacos (2011), using a methodology based on a specific stochastic bubble process, find some
evidence of periodically collapsing bubbles, especially in mortgage REIT series, a result that echoes
one of our findings.
5
2.1 Econometric Framework
Our research design builds on a discrete-time I-CAPM framework originally developed in Merton
(1973). According to the I-CAPM, if investment opportunities change over time, then assets exposures
to a variety of risk factors are important determinants of average returns in addition to the market
beta. In its conditional version, risk exposures are not constant but time-varying as a consequence of
macroeconomic and/or asset-specific news. We follow Campbell (1996) and proxy variations in the
investment opportunity set by using shocks to state variables that capture business cycle effects on
beliefs and/or preferences, as characterized by a pricing kernel with time-varying properties.3
Let yit be the asset returns in excess of the risk-free rate at time t, and xt = (Rmt,u
′
t)
′ the (k+1)-
dimensional vector of risk factors which includes the excess return on the market portfolio Rmt, and
the k shocks to macro-financial risk factors ut = (u1t, ..., ukt)
′. In its basic formulation, each asset
return time series is modeled as a dynamic multi-factor linear model
yit = z
′
tβit + ǫit, t = 1, . . . , T, i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where the vector zt = (1,x
′
t)
′ includes an intercept and the risk factors, βit = (βi0,t, βim,t, βi1,t, . . . , βik,t)
′
is a (k + 2)-vector of time-varying regression coefficients, and ǫit is such that Cov (zit, ǫit) = 0. We
assume that the residuals are cross-correlated, i.e. Cov (ǫit, ǫjt) 6= 0 for i 6= j, although they are
independent over time, i.e. Cov (ǫit, ǫit−h) = 0 for h > 0. The model can be rewritten in a more
compact form as,
yt = Z
′
tβt +A
−1Σtǫt, t = 1, . . . , T, (2)
with yt = (y1t, ..., ynt)
′ the n−dimensional vector of assets excess returns, Zt = diag {z1t, . . . , znt}
the block-diagonal matrix of covariates, β′t =
(
β′1t, . . . ,β
′
nt
)
the time-varying coefficient vector of
dimension n × (k + 2), ǫt = (ǫ1t, . . . , ǫnt)
′ the vector of residuals, and Σt =
(
σ21t, . . . , σ
2
nt
)
a diagonal
matrix for the idiosyncratic risks. Notice that Eq.(2) implies a non-diagonal time-varying covariance
structure for the reduced-form disturbances Ωt = A
−1Σt
(
A−1
)′
with A−1 a lower-triangular matrix
with ones on its main diagonal.4 A full time-varying conditional covariance structure, helps to mitigate
legitimate concerns about the potential mis-specification of risk factors which can exhibit a semi-
strong/strong factor structure in the residuals covariance matrix (see, e.g. Trzcinka 1986).5
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The factor model in Eq.(2) describes a general conditional pricing framework that is known to hold
under mild conditions. We specify the relationship between excess returns, factors and time-varying
factor loadings and idiosyncratic risk in a state-space form (henceforth, Bayesian Model Averaging
with Stochastic Break Betas and with Stochastic Break Volatility, BMA-SBB-SBV), where the time
varying parameters are described by the state equations
βij,t = βij,t−1 + κij,tηij,t i, j = 0,m, 1, ..., k, (3)
ln
(
σ2i,t
)
= ln
(
σ2i,t−1
)
+ κiν,tνi,t i = 1, ..., n, (4)
with the error terms ηij,t, ηij,t independent across assets, time and risk factors, such that
ηij,t ∼ N
(
0, q2ij
)
, i, j = 0,m, 1, ..., k,
νi,t ∼ N
(
0, q2iν
)
, i = 1, ..., n,
The stochastic variation in both the level of risk exposures and (the log of) the residual variance
are introduced and modeled through a change-point approach as in Ravazzolo, Paap, van Dijk, and
Franses (2007), Giordani and Kohn (2008) and Bianchi, Guidolin, and Ravazzolo (2015). The latent
binary random variables κij,t and κiν,t capture the presence of stochastic changes in betas and/or
idiosyncratic variance. This is formalized as;
Pr [κij,t = 1] = πij , i, j = 0,m, 1, ..., k, (5)
Pr [κiν,t = 1] = πiν i = 1, ..., n (6)
This specification is very flexible as generalizes more regular change-point processes such as Markov
regime switching dynamics. More specifically, (3)-(4) capture the idea that exposures to risk factors do
not necessarily change at each time t, allowing for periods in which time-invariance is imposed for some
t = τ on either the betas, i.e. κij,τ = 0, or idiosyncratic risk, i.e. κiν,τ = 0, or both κij,τ = κiν,τ = 0.
However, when κij,τ = 1 and/or κiv,τ = 1, then news hits either betas or idiosyncratic variances or
both, according to the random walk dynamics βij,τ = βij,τ−1 +ηij,τ and ln(σ
2
i,τ ) = ln(σ
2
i,τ−1)+ νi,t (or
σ2i,τ = σ
2
i,τ−1 exp(νi,τ )). When a break affects the betas and/or variances, the size of random shift is
measured by q2ij and q
2
iν , respectively.
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We incorporate model uncertainty by introducing a set of indicator variables Γ = (γ ′1, ...,γ
′
n),
which is a block-diagonal matrix where the block corresponding to the ith equation is given by
γi = (γi0, γim, γi1, ..., γik)
′, such that βij,t = 0 if γij = 0, and βij,t 6= 0 if γij = 1. We can explicitly
insert these indicator variables as a multiplying element as
yt = Z
′
tΓβt +A
−1Σtǫt, t = 1, . . . , T, (7)
One comment is in order. A standard problem with an I-CAPM implementation as in Eq. (2) is the
difficulty with interpreting the conditional intercepts when some (or all) risk factors are not themselves
traded portfolios. Unless all the factors are themselves tradable, there may be an important difference
between the theoretical alpha that the model uncovers, and the actual alpha that an investor may
achieve by trading assets on the basis of the multi-factor pricing model.
To avoid such a situation, we follow the literature and proceed as follows. If an economic risk
factor is measured or can be deterministically converted in the form of an excess return, such as the
U.S. market portfolio, credit- and default-spread variables, we use the corresponding excess returns as
a mimicking portfolio; Shanken (1992) shows that under some conditions, such an approach delivers
highly efficient risk premia estimates. Instead, if a risk factor is not an excess return, e.g. unemploy-
ment and money growth, we construct the corresponding k′ ≤ k mimicking portfolios by taking the
projection of the non-tradable factors onto the space of excess returns of some base assets (see e.g.,
Ferson and Korajczyk 1995, Lamont 2001, and Vassalou 2003).6
The state-space model defined by the observation equation (7) and the state equations (3)-(4)
represents the most general specification we consider in this paper. However, such a framework is
highly parametrized and we cannot rule out that problems related to over-parametrization could arise.
Therefore, for benchmarking purposes, we also estimated models derived by imposing a number of
restrictions on the dynamics of the state equation. First we consider the case with κiν,t = 0 ∀i, t, i.e.
a constant idiosyncratic volatility model. We will call this model a Bayesian Model Averaging with
Stochastic Break Betas model and constant idiosyncratic risks, i.e., BMA-SBB. Second, we consider
a standard random walk dynamics for both the betas and idiosyncratic risks, i.e. κij,t = 1 ∀i, j,
t and κiν,t = 1 ∀i, t. Such specification is common in some of existing literature (see, e.g. Jostova
and Philipov 2005), and assumes a unit probability of breaks in the dynamics of βij,t and σ
2
i,t over
time. This is fairly restrictive, and is not necessarily supported by the data, as we will document in
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our empirical analysis. We call this model Bayesian Model Averaging with Random Walk Betas and
with Random Walk Volatility (BMA-RWB-RWV). Trivially, the symmetric case of κij,t = κiv,t = 0
∀t implies that βij,t = βij,t−1 = βij and ln(σ
2
i,t) = ln(σ
2
i,t−1) = ln(σ
2
i ) and consists of the classical
case with constant betas and idiosyncratic variances. For both the general dynamics and each of
the restrictions above, we investigate the benefit of considering model uncertainty by alternatively
imposing γij = 1 for all risk factors and portfolios.
2.2 Prior Specification
Parameters and model indicators are random variables and therefore a prior is assigned to them. For
the structural break probabilities, we assume Beta distributions, i.e. πij ∼ Beta(aij , bij) for i = 1, ...n
and j = 0,m, 1, ..., k, ν, with aij , bij and aiν , biν representing the shape hyper-parameters and set
according to our prior beliefs about the occurrence of structural breaks. We assume structural breaks
are a priori independent across assets and factors, which allows us to greatly simplify the posterior
simulation step (see Appendix A). Note that, although a priori these latent breaks are assumed to
be independent across factors, portfolios, and over time, empirically we are not preventing breaks
from occurring simultaneously across portfolios and/or factor exposures, as expressed by the data
likelihood.
Similarly, the indicator variables γij are assumed to be independent and distributed according to a
Bernoulli distribution, i.e. γij ∼ Ber (λij) for i = 1, ..., n and j = 0,m, 1, ..., k, with λij reflecting our
prior beliefs about the inclusion probability of the jth risk factor in the ith portfolio. We assume the
intercept is always included in the model such that P [γi0 = 1] = 1, ∀i. The size of discrete changes
are assumed to be distributed as an Inverse-Gamma, i.e. q2ij ∼ IG (sijSij , Sij) for i = 1, ..., n and
j = 0,m, 1, ..., k, ν. Finally, the prior distribution for the lower-triangular matrix A is a standard
multivariate Normal, i.e. A ∼ N (µ,Ω). The density for the joint prior is given by the product of the
priors as these are independent across assets/portfolios.
In order to mitigate the impact that flat hyper-parameters might have, an initial five-year training
sample 1994:01-1998:12 is used to empirically calibrate the hyper-parameters of both time-varying
parameters, change-point probabilities and corresponding break sizes.7 We assume a flat prior for the
matrix A centered on zero with infinite variance. The testing period is 1999:01-2014:12.
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2.3 Model Estimation
Although we use a conjugate prior setting, the joint posterior distribution of the latent states and the
structural parameters is not available in closed form. In our framework, the latent states are repre-
sented by the time-varying factor loadings and idiosyncratic risks and their corresponding change-point
indicators at each time t. The structural parameters are defined by the probability of break occur-
rence, the corresponding magnitude and the regression indicators which capture model uncertainty.
We use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach and develop an efficient Gibbs sampling
scheme which is detailed in Appendix A. Marginal posterior distributions of quantities of interest
are computed as mixtures of the model-dependent marginal distributions weighted by the posterior
model probabilities. Integration over the model space is performed using our MCMC scheme which,
under mild regularity conditions, provides consistent estimates of the latent states and parameters.
This approach enables the construction of posterior probability intervals that take into account the
variability due to model uncertainty (see, e.g., Madigan and Raftery 1994).
3 Empirical Results
Our paper is based on a large panel of monthly time series sampled over the period 1994:01-2014:12.
The starting date derives from the availability of monthly return series for all the sector REIT total
return indexes used in this paper. Although the choice of portfolios vs. individual securities in tests
of multi-factor models is a researched topic in the empirical finance literature, in our case it is the
economic questions that best advise us to use portfolios of securities.
The series belong to two main categories. The first group, “Portfolio Returns”, includes stocks,
bonds and real estate, organized in portfolios. The stocks are publicly traded firms listed on the
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and sorted according to their four-digit SIC code. Industry-based
classification makes stock portfolios consistent with the investment specialization used to construct
REIT portfolios. Data on government bond returns are from Ibbotson, while the 1-month T-bill
and 10-year government bond yields are from FREDII at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Data on high-yield investment grade bond returns (Baa average corporate bond yields, 10-to-20 year
maturity) are from Moody’s and converted into returns using Shiller (1979)’s approximation formula.
The data on sector tax-qualified REIT total returns are obtained from the North American Real Estate
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Investment Trust (NAREIT) Association and consist of data on 11 portfolios formed when REITs are
classified on the basis of their main focus of activity, i.e., Industrial, Office, Shopping Centers, Regional
Malls, Free Standing shops, Apartments, Manufactured Homes, Healthcare, Lodging/Resorts, Self-
Storage and Mortgage REITs. Apartments and Manufactured Homes represent the “Residential”
real estate sector. Mortgage REITs specialize in mortgage-backed security investments. These are
breakdowns common in the literature (see e.g., Payne and Waters 2007). Excess return series are
computed as the difference between total returns and 1-month T-bill rates.
Second, we use a range of macroeconomic variables as standard proxies for systematic, economy-
wide risk factors potentially priced in asset returns. We employ thirteen economic factors which
have been previously studied in the literature: the excess return on a value-weighted market portfolio
that includes all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq; the aggregate dividend yield on
the CRSP value-weighted stock market portfolio; the unexpected inflation rate, computed as the
residual of a simple ARIMA(1,1,1) model applied to the (seasonally adjusted) log CPI index; the
unemployment rate; the 1-month real T-bill rate of return, computed as the difference between the
1-month T-bill nominal return and the realized CPI inflation rate; the term premium, measured as the
difference between 10-year and 1-month Treasury yields; money growth, computed as changes in the
money base; the credit spread, measured as the difference between Baa and Aaa Moody’s yields; the
default risk premium, approximated as the difference between Baa Moody’s and 10-year Treasuries
yields; the growth of (year-on-year, seasonally adjusted) industrial production; the growth of (year-
on-year, seasonally adjusted) real per-capita personal consumption expenditures on non-durables and
services; the traded Liquidity factor from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); and the return on Human
capital, measured as the growth rate of per-capita labor income.8
Figure 1 provides a visual summary of the movements of the REIT total return indexes under
investigation. As a benchmark, we also plot the total return index for the value-weighted market
portfolio (black solid line). To favor comparability across different sectors, all indexes are standardized
to equal 100 in correspondence with the end of January 2007. This date is chosen because most of
the literature (see e.g., Aı¨t-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, and Tamirisa 2009) has dated the
onset of the sub-prime crisis to early to mid-2007. To limit the number of series plotted, Industrial
and Office REITs are aggregated in a “Industrial/Office” (I&O) sector, Shopping Centers, Regional
Malls, Free Standing shops REITs into a “Retail” sector, and Apartments, Manufactured Homes into
11
a “Residential” one.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Two comments are in order. First, the residential sector peaks in correspondence to the end of 2006
and leads the aggregate stock market through all of 2007 and 2008. In fact, the mortgage REIT
sector had already boomed between 2003 and 2005 and—consistently with most anecdotal accounts
of the onset of the sub-prime crisis (e.g., Mian and Sufi 2009)—subsequently tumbled starting in late
Spring 2007. Second, panel B shows that, from the Fall of 2008—approximately after the demise of
Lehmann Brothers—the I&O and retail sectors started to lead (and fall at higher rate than) residential
and mortgage REITs (see e.g., Greenlee 2009). Interestingly, starting in Spring 2009, all four sectors
recovered somewhat, with their total return indexes approximately returning to the levels of late 2003,
but the residential REIT index displays a “V-shaped” bounce-back that has no equivalent in the case
of the other sectors. In fact, a simple calculation for the period January 2007 - December 2014 reveals
that residential REIT is the only portfolio in Figure 1 for which average returns are positive, albeit
small. In the following, we investigate the origins of these differential dynamics through the lenses of
a reduced-form multi-factor asset pricing model.
3.1 Heterogeneous Mispricing in the Real Estate Sector
Figure 2 reports the marginal posterior median estimates of βi0,t. In an I-CAPM implementation
as in Eq. (2), βi0,t 6= 0 shows evidence of a non-zero risk premium for a portfolio i with zero
exposures to the K risk factors. This implies the existence of arbitrage opportunities and clashes
with first principles (e.g., non-satiation). Equivalently, the time-varying alphas, βi0,ts, in our I-CAPM
implementation represent abnormal returns which cannot be rationalized by the asset exposures to
sources of systematic risk. The figure reports both the posterior medians (solid blue line) and the
95% credibility intervals (dashed black lines) for a set of REIT investment categories. Given our
research questions, we focus our attention on REITs portfolios. Apartments and Manufactured Homes
represent the “Residential” sector and the residual sub-sectors fall under the heading “Commercial”
real estate sector.9
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
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Figure 2 offers a rather stark view of a number of asset pricing trends that have involved real estate
over the past decade and a half: except for Lodging/Resort, all the Jensen’s alpha related to REITs
are positive and relatively large. Ex-post, we have evidence that—even in the light of a no-arbitrage
multi-factor model driven by macroeconomic risks—real estate as an asset class has been persistently
over-priced in the U.S., in the sense that realized excess returns have been (on average) higher than
what their exposure to systematic risk would have justified between 1999 and 2014. Additionally, and
with the partial exception of Lodging/Resort and Mortgage investments, all REIT portfolios describe
a rather homogeneous dynamics over time: the alphas start out relatively low (in fact, near zero in the
case of manufactured homes), and climb up, in some cases going from a few basis points per month
in late 2000 to as high as 2.5 percent per month. This was the great U.S. real estate bubble, with
trading, borrowing volumes and prices all exploding at the same time.
However, the posterior values for βi0,t for most sectors slowly declined between 2007 and 2009,
settling the average levels of unexplained performances to be virtually equivalent to zero percent,
when macro factors can perfectly explain average excess returns. In line with what most observers
argued, there has been a dramatic drop in abnormal returns especially within the residential sector.
Finally, mortgage REITs present a rather peculiar behavior over time: although the mispricing of
mortgages seems to have been rather large and accurately estimated during the 2001-2005 period
(when the corresponding posterior median βmortgages,0,t touched 2.5% per month), since 2005 the
mortgage alphas have been declining to reach on average just a few basis points below zero between
2005 and 2008.
Figure 2 shows no evidence of a pure housing/residential real estate abnormal valuations—as
measured by the mispricing of apartment and manufactured home-investing REITs—inflating between
2001 and 2007, to subsequently burst. All REIT sectors record a climb-up in alphas during this period.
In fact, it is the alphas of the retail/distribution-investing REIT sectors that show the steepest ascent,
with an increase in posterior medians between 2001 and 2007 in the range of 2 percent. Interestingly,
Figure 2 shows that all equity real estate sectors are sensibly characterized by average positive,
although highly volatile, mispricing at the end of our sample, possibly due to the massive interventions
in the mortgage-backed securities markets by the Federal Reserve between 2009 and 2011 that partly
aimed at stimulating the real estate market via reduction of borrowing costs.
In conclusion, Figure 2 tells a story that only partially matches the tale of the financial crisis often
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reported by the popular press and portions of the academic literature. On the one hand, it is a fact
that U.S. real estate would have been grossly and systematically over-priced between 2001 and 2007.
In this sense, the real estate fad has been pervasive. On the other hand, the 2007-2008 real estate
bust did not simply consist of a temporary residential real estate (housing) and mortgage-driven fad,
but occurred as a result of a large-scale, widespread correction of substantial mis-pricings of the entire
asset class.
3.2 Time-Varying Loadings and Posterior Inclusion Probabilities
The underlying assumption of our stochastic break dynamics (3)-(4) is that all macroeconomic news
do not necessarily hit investors information set at each time t. Thus, systematic risks exposures may
change at any point on time, although they do not have to be restricted to change at all points. One
way to assess the plausibility of our assumption is to observe the “degree” of instability, namely the
probability of having a break, for each of the betas across portfolios. Figure 3 reports the posterior
median estimates of the probability of having a break in the factor loadings for each REIT, stock and
bond portfolios computed from our benchmark BMA-SBB-SBV specification.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Bond portfolios show the highest instability in betas, with an average probability of a change point
in the betas which is slightly lower than 30% across factors. The instability of the betas is rather
homogeneous across macro-financial factors. While stocks show an intermediate level of instability,
betas for REIT portfolios appear to be more stable over time. Indeed, the average break probability
fluctuates between 10% to 15% across factors and sub-sectors. As a whole, Figure 3 shows that infre-
quent breaks in betas are isolated by our estimation procedure, making less parsimonious, although
benchmark-worthy, dynamics such as random walks less inefficient. We formally compare the perfor-
mance of our baseline specification and the random walk restriction for betas and idiosyncratic risks
in Section 4.
The BMA-SBB-SBV specification allows to assess the posterior probability that a given factor
enters in the dynamics of the pricing kernel. This probability can be inferred from the MCMC
posterior draws as λˆij =
1
G
∑
g=1 γ
(g)
ij for i = 1, ..., n and j = m, 1, ..., k with G the number of draws.
In words, λˆij represents the importance of the jth risk factor in the pricing of the ith portfolio. Figure
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4 shows the estimates across REIT portfolios.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Few factors turn out to be crucial for the pricing of real estate. More specifically, while aggregate
dividend yield, unemployment, consumption growth, aggregate credit/default risk and human capital
do not seem to affect the dynamics of REIT returns, market risk, unexpected inflation, and interest
rate risk appear to be sizable pricing factors. Aggregate liquidity plays a marginal role being significant
for Manufactured Homes only. However, we should bear in mind that we are investigating REITs,
i.e., publicly traded vehicles that may be seen as derivatives linked to actual property values. In
fact, although infrastructure and real estate may represent rather illiquid investments, REITs are
not. The fact that market risk plays the most prominent role is somehow unsurprising as indeed
REIT are likely heavily influenced by non-housing movements in the general US equity market. This
is the reason why other macroeconomic risk factors in the pricing kernel (2) enter orthogonally with
respect to market risk. In that respect, the beta for, say, unexpected inflation represents the exposure
of inflation risk above and beyond the effect of the aggregate stock market.10 Although to a lower
extent, money growth also turns out to be relevant for REITs dynamics. A potential explanation of
the effect of money supply may lies on the implications of the quantitative easing in the aftermath
of the great financial crisis of 2008/2009 as it had as its main objectives to stimulate the real estate
market and affect investors’ perception of risk. This is consistent with a literature that has related
real estate valuations to monetary policy (see e.g., Iacovello 2005; Iacovello and Neri 2010).
Based on the results of Figure 4, we report in Figures 5-7 the posterior medians for the betas
on market risk, term spread and unexpected inflation. In each plot, besides the posterior medians
estimated over time (solid blue line), we also show the associated 95% credibility region (dashed black
lines) of the posterior density of βij,t. However, judging of the “ statistical significance” of coefficients
on the basis of 95% credibility intervals represents a rather stringent criterion because the Bayesian
posterior density will reflect not only the uncertainty on the individual coefficient but also the overall
uncertainty on the entire model (i.e., the uncertainty on structural instability of all the coefficients as
well as uncertainty on the probability of inclusion of each of the factors).
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
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Figure 5 shows that over our 1999-2014 sample, REIT portfolios have a market beta that follows
a similar path over time, with a marked increase between 2003 and 2008; the corresponding 95%
confidence regions all come to exclude zero by the end of 2004, indicating that before the collapse
of the sub-prime market, none of the REITs offered hedging against aggregate market risk. This
is consistent with Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) and simple valuation principles. Intuitively, higher
market returns in the equity market have a positive effect on the income of tenants and potential house
buyers, increasing the probability of the rents being paid and houses being sold. Interestingly, the
exposure to market risk steadily decreases in the aftermath of the great financial crisis of 2008/2009.
As a result, market risk prove to be not statistically different from zero for most REIT investment
category by the end of the sample. Figure 6, indicates that over the last few years, market risk might
be outweighed by the riskiness implies by the regime of zero nominal interest rates occurred at the
end of the sample.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Except occasional nuances all REIT portfolios have negative exposures to the slope of the yield
curve by the end of the sample; βi,term,t tends to be large and negative with a posterior distribution
tilted away from zero, especially in the case of residential REITs. This negative relationship is
similar to a “flight-to-quality” effect typical of Treasury and bond portfolios, in the sense that REITs
command high risk premia exactly when the risk-less yield curve is positively sloped. This is not
entirely surprising. Equity REITs often hold long-term fixed leases, and they have to pay out most
of their earnings to investors. Thus, REITs may be exposed to variations in the yield curve based
on their inherent investment characteristics. In fact, the fixed nature of the underlying cash flows
and the limited growth opportunity of their assets, makes equity REITs resemble investments in
bond portfolios (see e.g. Graff 2001). As a whole, Figures 5 and 6 confirm the traditional view
often discussed in the literature that posits real estate would represent a “composite” asset class that
inherits mixed features (here, factor exposures) from both stocks and bonds, (see e.g., Simpson and
Ramchander 2007 and references therein).
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Figure 7 confirms another traditional property of real estate assets, namely, real estate investments
provide a good hedge against inflation. All sub-sector REIT portfolios display a strong and statistically
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significantly positive correlation with unexpected inflation. This is consistent with the view that
upward trending inflation increases the nominal value of future cash flows from underlying properties,
e.g. rents, and therefore have a positive correlation with returns on real estate assets. Possible
shocks to inflation turn out to be particularly relevant towards the end of the sample, where the joint
effect of lower interest rates and expected future inflation becomes more evident. A regime of low
interest rates tends to push property values up and can bolster net operating income. The more net
operating income generated by a property in response to inflation, the greater the likelihood that the
property will also appreciate in value, even if interest rates increase in the future, generating a positive
correlation between returns on real estate investments and inflation. As a whole, infrastructure and
real estate tend to have non-trivial positive betas on unexpected inflation.
Figures 5-7 show that for most factors and portfolios the BMA-SBB-SBV model reveals interesting
variation in betas. However, we emphasize that such time variation is not forced upon the data, in the
sense that a casual look at the plots reveals that combinations of test assets and factors can be found
for which the βij,ts implies little or no instability. For instance, in the bottom-center panel of Figure
6, concerning the exposure of Mortgage and Lodging/Resort to the yield spread, the plots reveal a
posterior median of βi,T erm,t that is almost flat during the first half of the sample. Interestingly, for
most factors the REIT sectors tend to share a common dynamics in their exposures, even when their
betas are characterized by different means. For instance, in Figure 5, the βij,ts with respect to market
risk all generally increase (the only partial exception is mortgage REITs), but a comparison between
sectors shows that magnitudes and rate of growths are quite different.
Our modeling framework accommodates for stochastic variations in (the log of) idiosyncratic
risk with unpredictable discrete shifts. This is consistent with a growing literature (see e.g., Engle,
Ghysels, and Sohn 2013) that has pointed out that residual variance, σ2it, is subject to potentially
relevant and persistent shifts over time. Figure 8 plots marginal posterior medians (solid blue line)
for σ2it estimated from our BMA-SBB-SBV model, along with 95% credibility intervals (dashed black
lines).
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 induces an increase in idiosyncratic risk, when the model had tem-
porarily reduced its ability to price REITs. The fact that idiosyncratic is counter-cyclical was largely
expected in the light of the literature (see Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu 2001). Large spikes
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are more pronounced for mortgage-, industrial- and retail-specialized (e.g. Shopping, Regional Malls)
REITs.
4 Model Assessment and Alternative Specifications
The I-CAPM implementation outlined in Section 2.1 represents the most general specification we
consider in this paper. However, one may argue the results might be driven by the dynamics of risk
exposures, or by the presence of heteroskedasticity versus constant idiosyncratic risk, or again by the
fact that the “right” set of risk factors can be precisely set ex-ante. Although our general specification
does not rule out a priori any of these possibilities, it is worth to carefully investigate if our preferred
specification may hurt from a pure asset pricing perspective. Therefore, the question we ask in this
section, as is common in many empirical papers, concerns the optimality of the specification we used
in investigating the pricing mechanism of our test portfolios.
We first compute the Bayes factors, which are the posterior odds of our BMA-SBB-SBV relative to
any alternative specification. Assuming each model is equally likely ex-ante, the Bayes factor for model
M1 represents the ratio of its marginal likelihood over the one implied by the competing specification
M0, i.e. BF10 = p (y|M1) /p (y|M0). Following Chib (1995), we compute the marginal likelihood by
importance sampling, replacing the unobservable breaks and parameters in the likelihood of the data
generating process (DGP) for each draw. The DGP changes for each of the specifications we used
(see section 2.1 for a discussion on alternative model restrictions). Table 1 reports the Bayes factors
for each specification of the dynamics in risk exposures and residual variances, with and without
accommodating for model uncertainty. As a rule of thumb a Bayes factor greater than 10 represents
strong evidence in favor of M1 (see Kass and Raftery 1995).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The top panel shows that the BMA-SBB-SBV model implies the best fitting performance across
the REITs test portfolios. Unsurprisingly, the SBB-SBV model ranks second outperforming both
the random walk and the homoskedastic specifications. Two comments are in order. First these
results indicate that fully acknowledging the instability of potentially discrete and unequally spaced
shifts in the dynamics of risk exposures might effectively help explain the time-series variation in
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portfolios returns. Second, as the lowest performance of the BMA-SBB and SBB specifications show,
time-varying idiosyncratic risk plays a relevant role that cannot be simply derogated by latent change-
point models for the betas. Interestingly, by disregarding the fact that the “correct” set of risk factors
is unknown ex-ante, sensibly deteriorates the in-sample performance of the models. The log-marginal
likelihood of the same specifications with a fixed set of risk factors are significantly lower than by
considering model uncertainty. The superior performance of a model with latent discrete break
specifications is confirmed across both bond and industry-classified equity portfolios (bottom panel),
similarly to the findings in Bianchi et al. (2015) and Nardari and Scruggs (2007) with reference to
alternative applications and model specifications.
Table 1 establishes the out-performance of our benchmark BMA-SBB-SBV model using an in-
sample statistical metric such as the Bayes factor. Yet, one would also like to have the comfort of
some economic measures. We follow Geweke and Zhou (1996) and compute the posterior average of
the squared pricing errors at each time t and across test portfolios. Conditional on the intercepts and
risk exposures at time t, the minimized squared average pricing error can be computed as
Q2t = β
′
0t
(
In −Bt
(
B′tBt
)−1
B′t
)
β0t/n, t = 1, ..., T (8)
where In is an n-dimensional identity matrix, β0t = (β10,t, ..., βn0,t)
′ represent the vector of Jensen’s
alphas and Bt =
(
β′mt,β
′
1t, . . . ,β
′
kt
)
is the n × (k + 1) matrix of exposures to the market portfolio
and additional macro risk factors for each asset. The posterior distribution of the squared average
pricing errors is obtained via draws from the Gibbs sampling scheme. Table 2 reports a set of sufficient
statistics of the ratios
√
Q2t,N |M1/
√
Q2t,N |M0, in which
√
Q2t,N |M1 is the square-root of (8) computed
from our benchmark BMA-SBB-SBV model and
√
Q2t,N |M0 represent the statistics obtained from
the alternative specification.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Our model yields the lowest pricing error across the full sample period, with an expected posterior
average error around 60% lower than competing specifications. Interestingly, the performance gap
tends to decline in the pre-2007 period, while it increases again in the 2007-2014 sub-sample. As a
whole, the model averaging specification with discrete shifts both in the betas and in idiosyncratic
risk substantially outperforms all competing specifications. Finally, we follow Ferson and Harvey
(1991), Ferson and Korajczyk (1995) and Karolyi and Sanders (1998) and assess the performance of
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each model specification on the basis of predictable variance decomposition tests (see Appendix B for
more details). In particular, we first compute the amount of predictable variation VR captured by
each specification starting from our general BMA-SBB-SBV model M1. Then, we report the ratio
between M1 and each competing specification M0, i.e. VRM1/VRM0 . Table 3 shows the results.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Approximately 60% more of the predictable variation in excess returns is captured by the BMA-
SBB-SBV model, on average across REITs and models. As far as real estate assets are concerned,
these relatively high ratios especially characterize industrial and retail commercial real estate. Also,
Office and Mortgage specialized REITs are characterized by a strong increase in explained predictable
variation. Such performance decreases for both government and corporate bond portfolios.
5 Conclusions
This paper tells a story that only partially matches the tale of the financial crisis often reported by
the popular press and portions of the academic literature. On the one hand, it is a fact that U.S. real
estate would have been grossly and systematically over-priced between 2001 and 2007. Yet, there is
no evidence of a pure residential real estate bubble inflating between 1999 and 2007, to subsequently
burst. Except for Lodging/Resort, all REIT sectors record a climb-up in alphas during this period,
without distinctions between residential vs non-residential sectors. In this sense, we show empirically
that the 2007-2008 real estate bust did not simply consist of a temporary residential real estate
(housing) and mortgage-driven fad, but occurred as a result of a large-scale, widespread correction of
substantial mis-pricings of the entire asset class. Also, the claim that the real estate overvaluations
would have been a debt/mortgage-fueled one is consistent with the fact that a drop in mortgage
REITs valuations in 2005 led other sectors.
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Notes
1Our question is mainly motivated by the fact that a vast literature has pointed out that, within the real estate asset
class, housing would be more prone to bubbles (see, e.g. Mikhed and Zemcˇ´ık 2009, Lai and Van Order 2010, Anderson
et al. 2011, Nneji et al. 2013, and Jin, Soydemir, and Tidwell 2014)
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2While residential (in particular, apartment-investing) REITs represent commercial property, the key distinction in
this paper is between real estate assets that are directly related to business activities (industrial buildings, offices, shop-
ping malls, and free-standing shops) vs. residential equity REITs that invest in manufactured homes and apartments,
as well as mortgage REITs that are involved with purchasing housing-related loans and mortgage-backed securities.
3It is important to specify a process for the time-series dynamics of the innovations variables uj,t. We adopt the
approach of Campbell (1996) and assume that the macroeconomic factors follow a first-order Vector Auto-Regressive
(VAR) process. To ensure that betas in model (2) are fully conditional, the VAR(1) is estimated recursively at each
time t. Thus, for a collection of risk factors zt, we estimate zτ = A0 +A1zτ−1 + uτ for τ = 1, ..., t, and t = t0, ..., T with
t0 an initial set of observations.
4In equation (2) we do not allow the elements in A−1 to vary over time. We do so since this would imply additional
N (N × 1) /2 state equations. In addition, existing literature finds little variations for A, e.g. Primiceri (2005).
5In a separate online Appendix we report further estimates on the conditional correlation structure obtained from
our benchmark model specification. On the one hand, we find evidence of a weak factor structure in idiosyncratic risk
of industry-related stocks. This is indeed consistent with existing empirical evidence, see, e.g. Goyal and Santa-Clara
(2003). On the other hand, there is no evidence of a strong factor structure in the conditional dependence structure of
REIT excess returns, which possibly implies a correct specification of our multi-factor pricing model for the real estate
asset class.
6The base assets consist of six equity zero net investment portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market as well as the
returns spread between long-term and short term government bonds and the return spread on long-term corporate bonds
minus long-term government bonds. In a separate online appendix we show that these base assets allow to capture a
great deal of sample variation of the non-tradable factors.
7In a separate online appendix we show that posterior estimates obtained without calibrating the priors with a five-
year training sample do not lead to sensibly different results. In this respect, the results are robust to the choice of the
initial five years to train the priors hyper-parameters.
8The per-capita labor income is constructed as the difference between total personal income and dividend payments,
divided by total population (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis). The growth rate then is computed by taking a
2-month moving average of per-capita labor income minus one (see Jagannathan and Wang 1996).
9In order to keep the graphs as much readable as possible we left aside the results for the Healthcare and Storage
sectors. Indeed, except few nuances, they share the same dynamics of the other commercial sub-sectors.
10In a separate online appendix we report a set of results concerning estimates in which we consider REIT returns
orthogonalized with respect to the excess returns on the market; the results are in line with the one presented although
the alphas are a bit smoother.
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Appendix
A The Gibbs Sampling Algorithm
Our Gibbs sampler is a combination of the Forward Filtering Backward Sampling of Carter and
Kohn (1994), Omori, Chib, Shepard, and Nakajima (2007) and the efficient sampling algorithm for
the random breaks proposed in Gerlach, Carter, and Kohn (2000). Let us denote the probability of
a break for the ith asset as πi = (πi0, πim, πi1, . . . , πik, πiν)
′ and the corresponding size of a break
as q2i =
(
q2i0, q
2
im, q
2
i1, . . . , q
2
ik
)′
. The vector that collects the parameters for a given asset is defined
as θi =
(
γ ′i, q
2
i ,π
2
i
)′
. Furthermore, let us collect the vector of binary structural breaks as Ki,t =
(κi0,t, κim,t, κi1,t, ..., κik,t)
′
From an estimation point of view, having a full stochastic volatility matrix poses significant
challenges as we now have to estimate additional N(N − 1)/2 parameters. Given our cross-section is
N = 33, this could make the computation quite cumbersome. To solve this issue we borrow insights
from a recent literature addressing stochastic volatility in large dimensional vector auto-regressive
models (see, e.g. Clark, Carriero, and Marcellino 2016). Let us define y⋆t = yt −A
−1Σtǫt the change
of variable that makes equations now independent on each other which allows us to estimate the
model equation by equation. At each iteration of the sampler we sequentially cycle through the above
steps as follows:
1. Draw γi conditional on σ
2
i,1:T ,Ki,1:T , κiν,1:T , θi, y
⋆
1:t and z1:t, for i = 1, ..., n
2. Draw Ki,1:T conditional on σ
2
i,1:T , θi, y
⋆
1:t and z1:t, for i = 1, ..., n
3. Draw βi,1:T conditional on σ
2
i,1:T ,Ki,1:T , θi, y
⋆
1:t and z1:t, for i = 1, ..., n.
4. Draw κiν,1:T conditional on σ
2
i,1:T , θi, y
⋆
1:t and z1:t, for i = 1, ..., n.
5. Draw σ2i,1:T conditional on βi,1:T ,Ki,1:T , κiν,1:T , θi, y
⋆
1:t and z1:t, for i = 1, ..., n.
6. Draw θi conditional on βi,1:T ,Ki,1:T , κiν,1:T , y
⋆
1:t and z1:t, for i = 1, ..., n.
7. Draw A conditional on
(
βi,1:T , . . . ,βn,1:T
)
, y⋆1:t and z1:t.
Where Ki,1:T and κiν,1:T represent the time-series of stochastic breaks for the betas βi,1:T and
idiosyncratic variances σ2i,1:T , respectively. We use a burn-in period of 10,000 and draw 50,000 obser-
vations storing every 5 draws to approximate the posterior of parameters and latent variables.
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Step 1. Sampling the Variable Selection γi
We follow George and McCulloch (1993), and Kuo and Mallick (1998) to address model uncertainty
while estimating the model dynamics. Conditional on the change of variable the regressor indicator
for the ith asset can be sampled from the posterior density for γij = 0 and γij = 1 given the value of
the other parameters. The full conditional posterior for the ith asset simplifies to:
p
(
γij = 1|γi[−j],βi,1:T ,Ki,1:T , κiν,1:T , σ
2
i,1:T , θi,y
⋆
1:t, z1:t
)
=
=
λij
∏T
t=1 p(y
∗
it|zt,βit, σ
2
it, γi[−j])|γij=1
(1− λij)
∏T
t=1 p(y
∗
it|zt,βit, σ
2
it, γi[−j])|γij=0 + λij
∏T
t=1 p(y
∗
it|zt,βit, σ
2
it, γi[−j])|γij=1
, (A.1)
for j = m, 1, ..., k, where γi[−j] = (γi1, ..., γij−1, γij+1, ..., γik)
′. We randomly choose the order in which
we sample the γij parameters. As starting value of the Gibbs sampler we consider a model which
includes all k risk factors.
Step 2 and 3. Sampling Ki,1:T and the Factor Loadings βi,1:T
The structural breaks in the conditional dynamics of the factor loadings for the ith asset, measured by
the latent binary state Ki,1:T , are drawn using the algorithm of Gerlach et al. (2000). This algorithm
increases the efficiency of the sampling procedure since allows to generate κij,t, without conditioning
on the relative regression parameters βij,t. We assume that each of the κijs breaks are independent
from each other.
Posterior draws for the time-varying betas are computed using a forward filtering backward sam-
pling as in Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (1994), and Carter and Kohn (1994). Both breaks and loadings are
sampled conditional on γi.
Step 4 and 5. Sampling κiν,1:T and σ
2
i,1:T .
Similarly to the conditional betas we draw the structural breaks for the ith asset, i.e. κiν,1:T , by
using the Gerlach et al. (2000) algorithm. The (log of) idiosyncratic risk, i.e. lnσ2it, is drawn using a
mixture distribution as in Kim, Shepard, and Chib (1998) and Omori et al. (2007). Mechanically in
each step of the Gibbs Samplers we simulate at each time t a component of the mixture. Now, given
the mixture component and the break indicator we can apply the standard Kalman filter method as
in step 2 and 3.
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Step 6a and 6b. Sampling the Stochastic Breaks Probabilities and Sizes.
The Beta prior for the stochastic break probabilities outlined in Section 2.2. is conjugate. As a result
posterior draws are updated on the basis on the filtered unobservable break indicators Ki,1:T and
κiν,1:T . The break probabilities for the betas are conditional on a given factor being selected, i.e.
γij = 1
πij |Ki,1:T ,γi ∼ Beta
(
aij +
T∑
t=1
κij,tγij , bij +
T∑
t=1
(1− κij,tγij)
)
, j = 0,m, 1, . . . , k
πiν |κiν,1:T ∼ Beta
(
aiν +
T∑
t=1
κiν,t, biν +
T∑
t=1
(1− κiν,t)
)
,
Similarly, the Inverse-Gamma prior for the conditional variances of both risk exposures and volatilities
is conjugate, leading to posterior updates after sampling the betas and (log) idiosyncratic variances
of the following form
q2ij |βi,1:T ,γi ∼ IG
(
sijSij +
T∑
t=1
κij,t (βij,t − βij,t−1)
2 , Sij +
T∑
t=1
κij,t
)
, j = 0,m, 1, . . . , k
q2iν |σ
2
i,1:T ,γi ∼ IG
(
siνSiν +
T∑
t=1
κiν,t
(
lnσ2i,t − lnσ
2
i,t−1
)2
, Siν +
T∑
t=1
κiν,t
)
,
Step 7. Sampling the Matrix A
Knowledge of the factor loadings and the idiosyncratic risks implies knowledge of the model structural
residuals ǫt which satisfy Σtǫt = Aǫ
∗
t with ǫ
∗
t = yt−Z
′
tΓβt the reduced form residuals. We can interpret
this as a system of equations with orthogonal residuals (see Cogley and Sargent 2005 and Clark et al.
2016 for applications on large dimensional VAR models);
ǫ∗1t = ǫ1t,
σ
−1/2
2,t ǫ
∗
2t = a21
(
−σ
−1/2
2t ǫ
∗
1t
)
+ σ
−1/2
2t ǫ2t
σ
−1/2
3,t ǫ
∗
3t = a31
(
−σ
−1/2
3t ǫ
∗
1t
)
+ a32
(
−σ
−1/2
3t ǫ
∗
2t
)
+ σ
−1/2
3t ǫ3t
...
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The Gaussian prior specified in Section 2.3 is conjugate and posterior draws for the ith equation can
be drawn from
Ai|Σ1:T ,β1:T ∼ N (µAi ,ΩAi) , µAi = ΩAi
(
Ω−1µ+R′iri
)
, ΩAi =
(
Ω−1 +R′iRi
)
,
with Σ1:T the time-series collection of diagonal matrices of idiosyncratic risks, β1:T the set of time-
varying loadings, and Ri and ri the right- and left-hand side variables in the above transformed
regressions.
B Predictable Variance Decomposition
Equation (2) decomposes excess asset returns in a component related to risk for each asset plus a
residual. In principle, a multi-factor model is as good as the implied percentage of total variation
in excess returns explained by its first component. Therefore, we follow Ferson and Harvey (1991),
Ferson and Korajczyk (1995) and Karolyi and Sanders (1998), and adopt the following approach.
First, the excess return on each asset is regressed onto a set of instrumental variables that proxy for
available information at time t− 1, Dt−1
yi,t = ϕi0 + ϕ
′
iDt−1 + ξi,t, (A.2)
to compute the sample variance of the resulting fitted values,
V ar[P (yit|Dt−1)] ≡ V ar
[
ϕˆi0 + ϕˆ
′
iDt−1
]
, (A.3)
where the notation P (yit|Dt−1) means “linear projection” of yit on a set of instruments, Dt−1. Second,
the betas are sampled from their (marginal) posterior distribution, and we compute the fitted risk
compensations, yˆt = Z
′
tΓˆβˆt. Now, for each of the asset i = 1, ..., n we regress the model-implied risk
premia onto the instrumental variables,
yˆi,t = ϕ
⋆
i0 + ϕ
⋆′
i Dt−1 + ξ
⋆
i,t, (A.4)
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to compute the sample variance of fitted posterior risk compensations:
V ar [P (yˆi,t|Dt−1)] ≡ V ar
[
ϕˆ⋆i0 + ϕˆ
⋆′
i Dt−1
]
. (A.5)
At this point, the predictable variance in the risk premia VR that is attributed to the model, relative
to the total predictable variance in the excess returns, can be computed as the ratio between Eq.(A.5)
and Eq.(A.3). The set of instruments includes lagged values of the earnings-to-price, the dividend-
payout ratios, and lagged credit yield spread (see, Goyal and Welch 2008 for a detailed description).
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Table 1: Bayes Factors
This table reports the Bayes factors computed as the ratio between the marginal likelihood of our benchmark BMA-SBB-SBV model and
competing models across assets, i.e. BF10 = p (y|M1) /p (y|M0) with M1, our preferred benchmark and M0 the competing specification. A
Bayes factor greater than 10 represents strong evidence in favour of M1 (see Kass and Raftery 1995). The top panel reports the Bayes factor
concerning the REITs classified according to the underlying investable properties as explained in section 3 in the main text (from column 2
to 13), and the Bayes factor for government and corporate bonds (from column 14 to the end). The bottom panel reports the results for the
industry sorted portfolios. The log marginal likelihood used to compute the Bayes factors are obtained from the MCMC estimation output by
integrating out uncertainty on the parameters, on the “right” set of risk factors, as well as the uncertainty on time-varying risk exposures and
idiosyncratic risks. Data are monthly and cover the sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The first five years of monthly data are used to calibrate
the priors for all models.
REIT Bond Portfolios
Ind Office Shop Malls FreeSt Apts Homes Health Lodg Storage Mortg 10-yrs 5-yrs 3-yrs 1-yrs High-Yield
BMA-SBB 126.3 124.9 125.8 111.3 132.4 126.1 120.6 129.9 129.1 118.0 119.0 126.1 102.3 107.5 140.7 41.10
BMA-RWB-RWV 40.18 44.25 41.26 33.36 50.22 41.38 47.11 37.38 34.24 33.24 27.12 57.67 56.78 56.24 65.15 70.26
SBB 161.1 169.1 163.4 151.0 173.4 160.2 169.1 153.8 149.3 147.3 144.8 182.3 180.7 185.1 198.2 205.1
RWB-RWV 59.39 70.25 65.36 51.14 76.17 65.33 74.24 60.24 49.73 55.21 36.41 87.28 86.38 85.41 95.24 102.8
SBB-SBV 26.36 35.25 31.03 17.28 40.91 31.24 39.34 25.47 17.25 21.31 5.632 51.39 50.54 49.42 59.15 67.23
Industry Portfolios
Food Mines Oil Clths Durbl Chems Cnsum Cnstr Steel FabPr Machn Cars Trans Utils Rtail Finan Other
BMA-SBB 112.0 116.4 119.3 139.4 64.6 119.8 101.8 119.2 133.4 108.1 134.3 140.1 59.35 131.8 95.13 91.33 55.38
BMA-RWB-RWV 66.92 24.29 44.44 52.72 55.92 57.37 54.18 52.75 46.69 53.24 52.67 52.65 59.69 47.66 62.77 59.86 66.66
SBB 193.2 135.6 158.0 168.6 179.0 175.3 179.6 169.2 169.8 176.8 179.1 174.7 183.0 170.0 184.6 185.3 194.5
RWB-RWV 98.33 37.69 68.55 77.40 85.63 87.62 85.76 80.41 70.63 82.66 82.06 79.40 90.34 75.36 92.46 90.41 100.9
SBB-SBV 61.69 4.635 33.61 43.61 50.32 51.31 49.53 45.42 36.36 47.41 46.04 44.06 54.68 40.42 57.14 54.96 64.65
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Table 2: Relative Pricing Errors
This table reports the median squared average cross-sectional relative pricing error, namely the ratio
between the pricing error implied by our benchmark BMA-SBB-SBV model and the one implied by
the competing restrictions. Conditional intercepts and risk exposures are sampled from their marginal
posterior distribution obtained integrating out both parameter and model uncertainty. Median values
of the pricing error measure are taken at each time t from the output of the MCMC estimation scheme
detailed in appendix A. Data are monthly and cover the sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The first
five years of monthly data are used to calibrate the priors for all the models.
Models Sample 1999:01-2014:12 Sample 1999:01-2007:01 Sample 2007:01-2014:12
Mean Std 5% 95% Mean Std 5% 95% Mean Std 5% 95%
BMA-SBB 0.283 0.201 0.332 0.273 0.261 0.070 0.320 0.211 0.313 0.189 0.350 0.276
BMA-RWB-RWV 0.417 0.633 0.415 0.496 0.385 0.268 0.410 0.378 0.458 0.568 0.415 0.460
SBB 0.319 0.205 0.345 0.298 0.351 0.528 0.344 0.377 0.297 0.218 0.316 0.268
SBB-SBV 0.478 0.405 0.484 0.444 0.492 0.760 0.484 0.517 0.468 0.404 0.435 0.415
RWB-RWV 0.359 0.227 0.424 0.334 0.329 0.076 0.439 0.278 0.402 0.211 0.445 0.331
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Table 3: Variance Ratios
This table reports the ratio of the predictable variation explained by our benchmark model over competing models across real estate, stock and bond portfolios. The
table reports the median values obtained from the marginal distribution of the risk exposures across assets. Draws from the marginal distribution are simulated from
the MCMC estimation output by integrating out both parameter and model uncertainty. Data are monthly and cover the sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The first five
years of monthly data are used to calibrate the priors for all the models.
REIT Bond Portfolios
Ind Office Shop Malls FreeSt Apts Homes Health Lodg Storage Mortg 10-yrs 5-yrs 3-yrs 1-yrs High-Yield
BMA-SBB 2.228 1.325 2.183 2.088 1.574 1.767 1.768 1.597 1.025 1.577 1.681 2.843 2.094 1.048 1.059 1.651
BMA-RWB-RWV 1.437 1.129 1.187 1.268 1.108 1.244 1.323 1.127 1.005 1.191 1.349 1.913 1.077 1.248 1.035 1.565
SBB 2.567 8.001 3.735 4.253 3.153 3.154 2.616 1.887 1.699 2.028 2.476 1.631 1.655 1.144 1.045 1.678
SBB-SBV 1.934 2.142 1.661 1.834 1.538 1.376 1.549 1.155 1.221 1.574 1.287 1.956 1.769 1.348 1.035 1.791
RWB-RWV 1.996 1.620 2.410 3.447 1.387 4.010 1.677 1.530 1.520 2.044 3.251 1.584 1.539 1.448 1.002 1.469
Industry Portfolios
Food Mines Oil Clths Durbl Chems Cnsum Cnstr Steel FabPr Machn Cars Trans Utils Rtail Finan Other
BMA-SBB 1.046 1.014 1.087 1.003 1.139 1.163 2.029 0.992 0.993 1.047 0.983 0.998 1.248 1.749 1.144 1.023 1.064
BMA-RWB-RWV 1.216 0.984 1.112 1.004 1.190 1.139 1.767 0.987 1.069 1.037 0.989 0.962 1.133 1.521 1.250 1.032 1.065
SBB 1.276 3.413 2.654 3.800 4.934 14.44 1.255 9.025 2.164 2.374 1.356 3.965 2.486 1.675 3.667 7.259 2.572
SBB-SBV 0.976 1.512 1.844 1.518 1.247 1.681 1.004 1.160 1.867 1.316 1.526 1.498 1.681 1.108 1.869 1.848 2.374
RWB-RWV 1.200 1.910 2.564 1.557 1.613 1.974 1.741 1.243 2.362 1.965 1.957 1.660 2.293 5.577 2.092 1.631 1.428
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Figure 1: REIT Indexes
The figures plot the REIT total return indexes for different underlying investment categories. In-
dustrial and Office REITs are aggregated in a “Industrial/Office” (I&O) sector, Shopping Centers,
Regional Malls, Free Standing shops REITs into a “Retail” sector, and Apartments, Manufactured
Homes into a “Residential” one. As a benchmark, we also plot the total return index for the value-
weighted market portfolio (black solid line). To favor comparability across different sectors, all indexes
are normalized to equal 100 in correspondence to the end of January 2007. Data are monthly and
cover the period 1994:01-2013:12.
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Figure 2: Time Series of Pricing Errors
The figure plots the conditional intercepts, i.e. the Jensen’s alphas, across different REIT investment categories. For ease of exposition, the figure does not report
Healthcare and Self-Storage REITs. Apartments and Manufactured Homes represent the “Residential” sector. Intercepts are sampled from their marginal distributions
once parameter and model uncertainty have been integrated out. Marginal distributions are approximated through the MCMC estimation scheme detailed in Appendix A.
The figure shows the result for our general Bayesian Model Averaging specification with Stochastic Breaks in Betas and Stochastic Breaks in Volatility (BMA-SBB-SBV).
The solid blue line represents the median value of the alpha at time t and the dot dashed black lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Data are monthly and cover the
sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The first five years of monthly data are used to calibrate the priors.
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Figure 3: Marginal Probability of a Change Point in Factor Loadings
The figure reports the median estimates of the marginal posterior probability across different REIT
investment categories. Break probabilities are sampled from their marginal distributions fully ac-
knowledging uncertainty on the “right” set of risk factors. Marginal distributions are approximated
through the MCMC estimation scheme detailed in Appendix A. The figure shows the result for our
general Bayesian Model Averaging specification with Stochastic Breaks in Betas and Stochastic Breaks
in Volatility (BMA-SBB-SBV). Data are monthly and cover the sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The
first five years of monthly data are used to calibrate the priors.
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Figure 4: Posterior Probability of Inclusion of a Risk Factor
The figure reports the median estimates of the posterior probability that a certain risk factor effec-
tively enters in the linear asset pricing model, computed across different REIT investment categories.
Inclusion probabilities are sampled from their marginal distributions fully acknowledging uncertainty
on both latent betas, idiosyncratic risks and their structural parameters. Marginal distributions are
approximated through the MCMC estimation scheme detailed in Appendix A. The figure shows the
result for our general Bayesian Model Averaging specification with Stochastic Breaks in Betas and
Stochastic Breaks in Volatility (BMA-SBB-SBV). Data are monthly and cover the sample period
1994:01 - 2014:12. The first five years of monthly data are used to calibrate the priors.
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Figure 5: Exposures of REITs to Market Risk
These plots show the conditional exposures to market risk, across different REIT investment categories. Market risk is measured as the
returns on the aggregate market portfolio in excess of the risk free rate. Apartments and Manufactured Homes represent the “Residential” real
estate sector. Betas are sampled from their marginal distributions once parameter and model uncertainty have been integrated out. Marginal
distributions are approximated through the MCMC estimation scheme detailed in the online appendix. The figure shows the result for our
general Bayesian Model Averaging specification with Stochastic Breaks in Betas and Stochastic Breaks in Volatility (BMA-SBB-SBV). The
solid blue line represents the median value of the alpha at time t and the dotted dashed black lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Data are
monthly and cover the sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The first five years of monthly data are used to calibrate the priors.
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Figure 6: Exposures of REITs to Interest Rates Risk
These plots show the conditional exposures to shocks on term spread across different REIT investment categories. This spread is the difference
between 10-year and a 1-year government bond yields. Apartments and Manufactured Homes represent the “Residential” real estate sector.
Betas are sampled from their marginal distributions once parameter and model uncertainty have been integrated out. Marginal distributions
are approximated through the MCMC estimation scheme detailed in Appendix A. The figure shows the result for our general Bayesian Model
Averaging specification with Stochastic Breaks in Betas and Stochastic Breaks in Volatility (BMA-SBB-SBV). The solid blue line represents
the median value of the alpha at time t and the dotted dashed black lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Data are monthly and cover the
sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The first five years of monthly data are used to calibrate the priors.
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Figure 7: Exposures of REITs to Inflation Risk
These plots show the conditional exposures to shocks to unexpected inflation across different REIT investment categories. Unexpected inflation
is measured as the residuals from an ARIMA(1,1,1) model fitted to the (seasonally adjusted) CPI index. Apartments and Manufactured Homes
represent the “Residential” real estate sector. Betas are sampled from their marginal distributions once parameter and model uncertainty
have been integrated out. Marginal distributions are approximated through the MCMC estimation scheme detailed in Appendix A. The figure
shows the result for our general Bayesian Model Averaging specification with Stochastic Breaks in Betas and Stochastic Breaks in Volatility
(BMA-SBB-SBV). The solid blue line represents the median value of the alpha at time t and the dotted dashed black lines are the 95%
confidence intervals. Data are monthly and cover the sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The first five years of monthly data are used to calibrate
the priors.
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Figure 8: Dynamics of Idiosyncratic Risk
These plots show the dynamics of idiosyncratic risk across different REIT investment categories. Apartments and Manufactured Homes
represent the “Residential” real estate sector. Idiosyncratic risks are sampled from their marginal distributions once parameter and model
uncertainty have been integrated out. Marginal distributions are approximated through the MCMC estimation scheme detailed in Appendix
A. The figure shows the results for our general Bayesian Model Averaging specification with Stochastic Breaks in Betas and Stochastic Breaks
in Volatility (BMA-SBB-SBV). The solid blue line represents the median value of the alpha at time t and the dotted dashed black lines are
the 95% confidence intervals. Data are monthly and cover the sample period 1994:01 - 2014:12. The first five years of monthly data are used
to calibrate the priors.
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